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Abstract
This paper analyzes the decision of “green” economists to participate in the carbon offset market, and how this
decision is related with the views that these experts hold on offsets. It also compares the preferences of economists
with those of the general public, as emphasized in the literature. The paper exploits a unique dataset examining the
decision to purchase carbon offsets at two academic conferences in environmental and ecological economics. We find
that having the conference expenses covered by one's institution increases the likelihood of offsetting, but practical and
ethical reservations as well as personal characteristics and preferences also play an important role. We focus on the
effect of objecting to the use of offsets and discuss the implications for practitioners and policy-makers. Based on our
findings, we suggest that ecological and environmental economists should be more involved in the design and use of
carbon offsets.
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Introduction

While international negotiators have struggled to find an effective agreement limiting global greenhouse gas
emissions for two decades, an important contribution to climate change mitigation has come from unilateral
initiatives from countries, regions, cities and private citizens (Jordan et al. 2015; UNEP 2015). This trend
supports Ostrom’s vision of the rise of polycentric governance, and more generally the non-negligible scope for
cooperation in the climate commons (Ostrom 2009; Tavoni and Levin 2014; Carattini et al. 2015). A notable
example of voluntary provision of climate change mitigation is represented by the market for voluntary carbon
offsets. This market has grown exponentially in the last decade: in their analysis, Conte and Kotchen (2011)
reported the existence of 97 offset providers and 280 offset projects. According to the same source, we now
count, at least four years later, 142 registered providers of 579 projects worldwide1 .
From a theoretical perspective, individuals may voluntarily contribute to a public good because they
derive some utility from the public good being provided (pure altruism) or from their own contribution, due
for instance to warm glow (Andreoni 1990) or positive self-image (Nyborg et al. 2006). A further and very
contextual explanation relies on the idea of compensating other activities that reduce the overall level of
the same public good. By contributing to the emission of greenhouse gases (either directly or indirectly),
one reduces the overall level of the public good, which is in this case represented by a level of atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions that do not cause severe damages to the climate system. Yet, one
can purchase offsets and keep atmospheric concentrations constant, so that the overall level of the public good
is unaffected (Kotchen 2009; Conte and Kotchen 2010). Assuming that one cares about one’s own carbon
footprint, from a standard economic perspective it is efficient to purchase carbon offsets as long as their cost
is lower than one’s own marginal abatement cost. By buying carbon offsets for, say, one ton of greenhouse
gas emissions, one funds the implementation of a program aiming to abate emissions at least by one ton.
Abatements can take the form, for instance, of investments in energy efficiency (e.g. clean cook stoves),
or reforestation programs. Programs are generally run by the so-called providers, local non-governmental
organizations or companies, which may then ask external institutions to certify that the emission abatement
actually took place. Since multiple types of projects on different activities can be undertaken to offset
emissions, and since these projects can be realized by different organizations in different countries, not all
offset programs look the same, and issues of trust and credibility may arise. In this paper we also consider
these issues, and how “green” economists deal with them.
Carbon offsets are purchased by individuals, companies and organizations concerned with their environmental footprint or the image that such footprint conveys. Academic activities such as travel to conferences
are receveing increasing attention due to their sizable carbon footprint (Spinellis and Louridas 2013; Desiere
2016), and many academic institutions have started using carbon offsets to contribute to internalize the climate externality. In 2015, the conferences of both the European Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists (EAERE, held in Helsinki, June 24-27, 2015) and the European Society for Ecological Economics
(ESEE, held in Leeds, June 30-July 3, 2015) offered registering participants the possibility to purchase carbon offsets to compensate for the emissions associated with their participation. We exploit this opportunity
to provide novel evidence on the economics of carbon offsets. Pooling the two groups, in this paper we refer
to them as “green economists”. With this term we denote economists dealing with environmental issues,
whose work predominantly falls in the ecological and environmental economics categories. Note that these
social scientists may not necessarily define themselves as economists, or environmentalists.
A growing literature, including the one pertaining to the demand for climate change mitigation, has
focused on the main determinants of the demand for offsets, generally relying on stated preferences (see
Nemet and Johnson 2010 for a review). We rely both on official conference data about observed offsetting
behavior and on a survey which we asked participants of both conferences to take. The survey request was
sent after the offset decision was made by participants, and it provides useful complementary information
that allows us to assess the rationale behind the offsetting decision. This particular chronology is used to
decrease the likelihood of dishonest (socially desirable) answers. It also allows us to compare the answers in
our sample to the general behavior of the conference participants.
The behavior of experts, as observed in the field, may differ dramatically from the behavior of lay people
(List 2003; Harrison and List 2004). Previous research has shown that environmental economists’ decision
to offset does not depend on the default option given in the registration process, i.e. the fact that, without
1 Source:

http://www.carboncatalog.org/. Visited October 23, 2015.

explicitly opting out, carbon offsets are billed to the conference participant along with the other registration
fees, whereas the default option can have a positive uptake effect on pro-environmental behavior by lay
people (Löfgren et al. 2012; see also Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008). The refutation of this stylized fact
among experts suggests that they tend to have a set opinion on carbon offsets. Furthermore, the general
public has expressed skepticism due to both ethical and practical concerns about the use of carbon offsets
(cf. Conte and Kotchen 2010). We thus shed light on whether these objections are also shared by experts,
and how they affect the decision to purchase the conference offsets.
We find that having the conference expenses and offsets covered by the institutions clearly increases the
likelihood of offset adoption. However, funding is only a partial explanation. Even in this specific case of
potential moral hazard, we find that a sufficiently high level of satisfaction with the proposed offsetting
program is necessary to induce economists with practical reservations to participate in offsetting activities.
We also find that some individual-specific characteristics have a surprising impact on the likelihood to offset.
Based on these results, we derive several implications for both practitioners and policy-makers.

2

Methodology

In 2015 EAERE allowed those that registered to the annual conference to purchase a 10-euro offset certificate
to compensate European flights and a 40-euro offset for intercontinental flights. The revenue was used to
prevent eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, ESEE offered the possibility to withdraw one ton
of CO2 from the European Union Emission Trading System2 . With the support of the local organizers we
contacted all participants from the two conferences and invited them to participate in the same anonymous
online questionnaire.
We obtained data on the offset decision and a series of participants’ personal and academic characteristics.
The main descriptive statistics are displayed in Table A.I and A.II. We collected 176 (66) observations for
the ESEE (EAERE) conference, for a total of 242 responses. Based on ESEE data, we know that 495
researchers registered at the conference, of which 195 were students. The implied response rate was on
the order of 35%, which is higher than the one reported in most online surveys (Evans and Mathur 2005).
Our sample consists of about 45% students, approximately the same as the observed proportion in the
underlying population. Participation to the offset program was around 46% in our ESEE sample, quite close
to the actual participation (around 50% according to the organizers). The response rate for EAERE was
instead about 10%, and participation to the offset program was around 37% (the official participation rate
is approximately 20%). Based on these statistics, we can arguably provide better external validity for the
ESEE conference relative to the one organized by EAERE3 .
We also have information on whether the institution covers the conference-related expenses, and whether
it covers the offsets for those that purchased them4 . Conference expenses were covered by the institution for
the vast majority of respondents (73%). The possibility of passing on the cost of offsetting is an unexplored
situation for the young literature on carbon offsets and comes with potentially large implications not only
for academics but possibly also for business travelers at large5 . Since most individuals in our sample were
likely to have the possibility to fully pass on the costs of offsets, it is particularly interesting to understand
why some of them refrain from offsetting.
We also know how the survey participants reached the conference and whether they had any reservations
concerning the use of offsets. That is, participants were requested to express any concerns they might have
concerning offsetting in general, regardless of the option proposed by the respective conference. About 20%
2 The details of the offsets programs were also provided to conference participants through the conference websites and
booklets. While they differ in their characteristics, both options correspond to the definition of carbon offsets. We discuss
below the implications of the two different programs for our analysis. Recall that the EAERE conference took place in Helsinki,
Finland, and the ESEE conference took place in Leeds, United Kingdom.
3 In all estimations we introduce a dummy variable controlling for the conference that the respondent attended. In this way
we are able to capture the difference between the two samples. Given the relatively low number of observations available for
the EAERE conference, we take a conservative stance and refrain from providing estimations for small subsamples.
4 Since the two variables (one measuring whether the institution covers the conference-related expenses, and one measuring
whether it also covers the offsets) are 74% correlated, and the latter would always predict success in the econometric model
(since the outcome variable does not vary among these participants), we only introduce the former in the analysis.
5 The civil aviation industry is said to be responsible for about 2% of global and about 10% of transport greenhouse gas
emissions (IPCC 2014). A non-negligible part of these emissions is due to business travelers, who are known to be particularly
inelastic to price variation (Borenstein and Rose 2007; Puller and Taylor 2012).

(15%) of the sample expressed ethical (practical) reservations. Those who did were prompted to answer
an additional open question, to elicit their perplexities (see the most emblematic answers in Table A.III).
Most comments concerning practical issues casted doubts on the effective abatement realized by offsetting
programs in general, raising issues of additionality and credibility, in particular absent any tight oversight
(see Schneider and Kollmuss 2015). This might created an additional difference between economists and lay
people, the latter being especially favorable to forest offsets (Blasch and Farsi 2014). Part of the ethical
critique challenged the monetization of pollution, while the remaining responses broached the subject of
moral licensing. That is, they challenged the practice of continuing to emit while (sometimes) offsetting,
calling into question the moral implication of encouraging offsets and justifying carbon-intensive lifestyles
(see Anderson 2012 for a detailed critique). Finally, respondents were asked to rate the specific offsetting
program chosen by the conference organizers.
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Results

Estimates are provided in Tables I and II. Given the binary nature of this decision, we use probit regressions6 . In Table I we test our main specifications. We bundle all participants having reached the conference
by plane and compare them with relatively cleaner transport modes. We also control for whether the conference expenses are covered by the participant’s institution and introduce a dummy for the conference to which
the data refer. This dummy could measure either the difference in the audience or in the offset programs
proposed by the organizers (we control to a large extent for distance to conference by transport modes).
The two offsetting programs are indeed relatively different in their typology, each conference organizer possibly facing a different set of preferences for offsetting projects (see below). Hence, to disentangle the two
effects and capture differences in audience, we include the total number of EAERE and ESEE conferences
attended by all participants, regardless of their current choice. This strategy allows us to capture differences
in the identification of researchers to either or both societies, taking also into account potential differences in
preferences for attending conferences. In turn, differences in belonging may be also driven by different backgrounds, for which we are unable to control. The environment around ecological economics is indeed known
to be particularly multidisciplinary, whereas environmental economists are usually trained as economists.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use the term “green economists” in a broad sense, knowing that not
all individuals in our study may identify with mainstream economics. Of course, this heterogeneity may
also imply different degrees of expertise among the respondents in our sample. We provide further analyses
below, which aims at identifying varying perspectives among those who we define as green economists, in
particular with respect to the perceived appropriate approach to growth in dealing with climate change. We
also include information on the academic rank of the interviewee. Column (2) controls for the country of
affiliation for a number of countries for which we have multiple observations. In column (3) we introduce
attitudes towards offsets.
First of all, we observe that the ability to pass on the full cost of the conference to the employer is
associated with a higher probability of offsetting. While the positive and relatively large coefficient suggests
that it is easier for economists to be green with their institution’s money than with their own, the implied
marginal increase in probability is still far from one. Hence, other reasons have to be explored to explain why
economists may not offset even when this is likely to come at no private cost. Surprisingly, the probability
of offsetting decreases almost monotonically as we move from students to full professors. One explanation
might be that tenured participants are less likely to do their booking themselves and incentives may then be
better aligned with their departments’. An alternative explanation is that established academics - especially
in economics - may be particularly cynical, for either selection or training reasons (see Fourcade et al. 2015).
The negative and significant coefficient for some countries such as Spain and Germany relative to the rest
of the world suggests that there may be differences in income as well as in the tightness of the budget
constraint, even when controlling for whether the institution covers the expenses. Even if offsets could be
passed on, overspending at one conference may have implications for the opportunity to attend other events,
6 The EAERE conference distinguishes offsetting between continental and intercontinental flights. The latter was chosen by
2% of the conference participants. Given the number of observations at our disposal, we keep offsetting as a binary outcome.
Our results would not change if controlling for flying an intercontinental flight. The empirical results are qualitatively and in
most cases quantitatively unchanged if a logit specification or marginal effects at mean are used instead of average marginal
effects. All variables are in levels.

Table I: Decision to offset - Main estimates from Probit

Reaching the conference by plane
Institution covering expenses
ESEE survey
Characteristics of the participant
ESEE conferences attended
EAERE conferences attended
Female
Age
Student
PhD student
Postdoctoral researcher
Senior researcher
Assistant professor
Associate professor
Full professor
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Spain
Switzerland
UK
Opinion on offsets
Contrasting behavioral changes
Pricing the unpriceable
Doubts on the effective realization
Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood
N

(1)
Marginal effects
0.061
0.130*
0.139

S.E.
(0.077)
(0.076)
(0.104)

0.014
0.029
-0.051
0.124**
0.603***
0.235
0.183
0.010
0.040
0.072
-0.118

(0.023)
(0.025)
(0.069)
(0.054)
(0.072)
(0.229)
(0.263)
(0.301)
(0.303)
(0.320)
(0.259)

(2)
Marginal effects
0.101
0.163**
0.168*

S.E.
(0.093)
(0.073)
(0.099)

Marginal effects
0.103
0.166**
0.151

S.E.
(0.088)
(0.070)
(0.098)

0.019
0.032
-0.067
0.133**
0.621***
0.300
0.239
0.072
0.067
0.064
-0.091
-0.046
-0.149
-0.229***
-0.219**
0.035
0.028

(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.068)
(0.052)
(0.048)
(0.198)
(0.251)
(0.304)
(0.299)
(0.312)
(0.269)
(0.145)
(0.131)
(0.076)
(0.099)
(0.151)
(0.109)

0.022
0.027
-0.060
0.134**
0.610**
0.255
0.171
0.007
0.008
-0.008
-0.142
-0.031
-0.134*
-0.218***
-0.224**
0.088
0.011

(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.067)
(0.052)
(0.062)
(0.209)
(0.255)
(0.287)
(0.283)
(0.291)
(0.238)
(0.144)
(0.126)
(0.076)
(0.090)
(0.148)
(0.103)

0.089
-0.151
0.279***
0.49
-114.24
201

(0.096)
(0.187)
(0.096)

0.072
-124.47
201

(3)

0.114
-118.96
201

Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
Some participants declare to have already offset through alternative programs.
With our set of controls this variable predicts failure perfectly and is thus not included among the covariates. Clerk is the reference category for the academic position.

or use departmental funds for other research purposes. Given the positive sign of the age variable, most of
the effect it captures is probably related to residual differences in seniority rather than different generational
perspectives7 . Finally, we note that the propensity to offset is higher among economists having participated
in the ESEE conference. Hence, one may argue that the offsets proposed at the ESEE conference were more
successful in convincing economists to adopt them, compared to those offered by the EAERE conference.
However, this conclusion presumes that we are able to fully control for differences in the composition of the
conference public, and that thus the conference dummy mainly reflects differences in offset types. This is
probably not the case, and we thus provide below additional analyses aiming to further capture differences
among attendees at the two conferences.
The estimates from column (3) indicate a positive and significant effect related to expressing concerns
on the practical implementation of offsets. Not only does “expressing pragmatic concerns” not imply that
they will not purchase offsets from the organizers, it actually increases the likelihood that they will. That
is, expressing pragmatic concerns is related with a higher propensity to purchase the offsets. This fact
is of particular interest. Our interpretation is that ecological and environmental economists are indeed
experienced consumers as suggested by Löfgren et al. (2012), and not only are unaffected by the default
choices but may also be particularly attentive to the properties of the offsetting program that they are asked
to purchase. We observe that, despite the general practical concerns that these economists express, part of
them appear to be convinced by the organizers’ proposal and to trust their offsetting choice. While it is an
open empirical question whether trust is mainly placed in the particular specification of the offsets, or in the
society choosing the offsets, i.e. EAERE or ESEE, and while we have no counterfactual evidence on what
would have been the frequency of offsetting had the organizers proposed a different program, we believe
that both explanations might have played a role and that this first result may come already with particular
implications. As for any good (and policy), its design and characteristics can matter for attentive consumers,
e.g. those expressing practical reservations. Conference participants may be requested to trade-off the warm
glow or self-image benefit from offsetting with guilt from charging institutes a higher bill. This result also
suggests that conference organizers might have done a relatively good job in addressing the potential critiques
from their attendees, critiques which could differ between conferences (see below), and proposed an offsetting
option that could convince at least those having practical concerns over offsetting in general terms.
This finding is supported by the results of Table II, where we restrict attention to the 183 respondents
who rated the proposed offset program. Controlling for the same covariates as in column (3) of Table I, our
estimates from column (1) point to a positive and significant effect of appreciating the specific program. The
coefficient implies that any marginal improvement on the 7-point scale comes with a 6% higher likelihood
of offsetting, thus suggesting that experts align their actions with their beliefs. Note that the distribution
of concerns about the offsetting program is different between conferences, with ethical implications being
primarily a concern for ecological economists. That is, while we do not find a significant difference in
the frequency of offsetting between the two populations, the reasons for offsetting may substantially differ.
To further differentiate between the attendees at the two conferences we control in column (2) for what
respondents consider the most appropriate approach to growth while tackling climate change. 75% (20%)
of the EAERE (ESEE) sample support green growth whereas 11% (68%) declare to be rather favorable to
degrowth, pointing to persistent differences in the characteristics of economists attending one or the other
conference, in spite of the convergence in the main research outlets. Following the analysis of Plumecocq
(2014), authors of articles published by Ecological Economics may not consider themselves as ecological
economists, or simply there is a lot of variability within the field of ecological economics, including the more
recent differentiation between “pragmatic ecological economists”, who may be relatively incline to accept
monetary compensation schemes, and “social-ecological economists” (cf. Spash and Ryan 2012). We observe
that the coefficient for the ESEE conference becomes practically zero, suggesting that this decoupling in
preferences for (de)growth probably contributes to differentiate between “real” ecological and environmental
economists. Comparing Tables I and II, we realize that most of the effect of the ESEE dummy variable is
driven by differences in the composition of the conference attendees, probably sufficiently captured only when
controlling for preferences for degrowth, while controlling for the level of satisfaction with the specific offset
program does not affect the ESEE dummy much. Hence, the two offset programs seem to have received
comparable support among the participants to their respective conferences. Compared to green growth,
7 We use six of the seven U.S. Census age categories (see Table A.I for more details). The coefficient for age remains positive
and significant if using mid-points for each category.

Table II: Decision to offset - Additional estimates from Probit (restricted sample)

Reaching the conference by plane
Institution covering expenses
ESEE
Satisfaction with green offsets

(1)
Marginal effects (S.E.)
0.041
(0.097)
0.087
(0.076)
0.113
(0.104)
0.062***
(0.017)

Degrowth as appropriate approach to climate change
Characteristics of the participant
Opinion on offsets
Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood
N

Yes
Yes
0.259
-83.00
167

(2)
Marginal effects (S.E.)
0.015
(0.102)
0.087
(0.082)
-0.009
(0.122)
0.066***
(0.017)
0.159*
(0.097)
Yes
Yes
0.282
-71.34
147

Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.

being in favor of degrowth is associated to a higher propensity to offset.
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Discussion

The empirical analysis of offsetting decisions we have performed here allows us to study the behavior of
experts and derive some lessons for both practitioners and policy-makers. First, we find that the ability
of passing over the conference costs to one’s employer increases the likelihood of participating in the offset
market. While this finding may seem obvious, it has important implications. Emissions from traveling, in
particular from aviation, represent a non-negligible portion of global greenhouse gases and their regulation
under the umbrella of an international agreement is still part of a fierce debate. Managing to make offsetting
the norm when traveling for business would provide a large push forward for voluntary carbon markets,
implying also higher prices and stronger signals for all actors in the carbon market. As more offsetting
projects could be funded, larger emission abatements could be achieved. Second, we provide empirical
evidence that practical concerns with the mechanics of offsets may coexist with their uptake. This somewhat
unexpected result has far-reaching implications. Skepticism based on practical issues is founded on recent
negative experience with carbon markets, and is likely to be persistent. Whether such experiences will hinder
the development of voluntary offsets and carbon markets is an open question. Our preliminary answer, based
on experts’ behavior, is that such skepticism should be an additional motivation for offsets program managers
to offer sound projects that reassure potential buyers. Our evidence suggests that both academic societies
were quite successful in this task. Project providers should learn from this experience. The same applies to
policy-makers, who now face the hard task of rebuilding confidence in integrated carbon markets and deliver
“internationally transferable mitigation outcomes” (article 6 of the Paris Agreement). Failing to do so could
imply very high mitigation costs, and could possibly jeopardize the current pledges and the ambition of more
stringent post-2020 targets (Baranzini et al. 2015). Whether the opinion of the public is as reactive to the
properties of different offsetting designs is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our results suggest that
the experts’ ability to distinguish sound offsetting projects from unreliable ones could and probably should
be put at the service of society, to both orient policy decisions and increase confidence in sound offsetting. In
this sense, further research on the reservations of the general public, and how these may be affected by expert
opinion, would be useful to shed light on the potential for the profession to increase the market for voluntary
carbon offsets in size and quality, as well as to contribute to the acceptability of future international carbon
markets.
Finally, this study provides new information about conference participants in ecological and environmental economics, with useful implications for all economists active in the field. While one may argue that the
separating line between environmental and ecological economics is increasingly blurred (Plumecocq 2014),
such difference persists among those that attend the respective conferences, perhaps due to a greater proclivity for interdisciplinary work in economics in recent years (Tavoni and Levin 2014). Hence, looking only
at convergence in journals, one may miss part of the story of the evolution of ecological and environmental economics as schools of thought organized in different and possibly competing societies. Based on our
results, we speculate that to appreciate the differences that set the two apart, one should attend both conferences, since the conceptual differences between ecological and environmental economics are more nuanced in
the publications of the respective flagship journals. In this respect, we stress again the important diversity
among ecological economists, and how Europe-based ecological economists may be particularly different from
American ecological economists, who may have more common points with environmental economists. ESEE
was indeed created in reaction to the International Society for Ecological Economics being excessively close
to mainstream economics, in the eyes of ESEE’s founders (Røpke 2005).

5

Conclusions

In the last decade, the market for voluntary offsets has grown rapidly yet remains a niche market, even
within the realm of climate-friendly behaviors. The use of offset is limited among business travelers, even
though in many situations businessmen could seemingly pass over the cost of offsets to their employer. We
investigated this issue by analyzing the behavior of ecological and environmental economists who are likely to
be familiar with such instruments. We found that having the option to pass over the cost is associated with

a larger likelihood of offsetting. However, economists could be reluctant to purchase offsets for a number of
reasons, which might also differ between ecological and environmental economists. Ethical concerns mainly
challenged the pollute-and-offset paradigm, which tends to lend legitimacy to more business as usual and
possibly delay the required regime shift towards a society living within planetary boundaries. Practical
concerns were related with the effective realization of offsets, including issues of additionality and credibility.
We believe that all these concerns expressed by experts should be given an appropriate space in the
societal debate and should be taken into account by policymakers, who in the next years are likely to
increasingly rely on carbon credits to meet their pledges. Likewise, project providers have much to learn
from an open dialogue with the end-users, with a view to facilitating future growth in this market. While the
profession has expressed many concerns towards carbon offsets, it follows from the participation rates in both
conference offset programs that a substantial fraction of both ecological and environmental economists are
willing to participate in voluntary carbon markets. Based on our survey, we argue that this finding applies as
long as offset projects meet certain criteria. Scaling up voluntary carbon markets and governments’ purchase
of offsets in foreign countries may thus benefit from the profession’s endorsement, which of course needs to
be earned with proper design and transparent proposals.
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Appendix
A.1

Tables
Table A.I: Summary statistics: socio-economic and professional characteristics
Variable

Mean Min.
Socio-economic characteristics
Gender (female)
0.495
0
Age (15-24; ... ; 55-64; >65) 3.627
2
Professional characteristics
BA/MA student
0.033
0
PhD student
0.405
0
Post-doctoral researcher
0.194
0
Senior researcher
0.077
0
Assistant professor
0.068
0
Associate professor
0.068
0
Full professor
0.072
0
Clerk
0.131
0

Max.

N

1
7

220
220

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

212
222
222
222
222
222
222
222

Table A.II: Summary statistics: Transport modes, offset decisions and preferences
Variable

Mean

Min.

Max.

N

Offset
Decision to offset
0.409
0
1
Institution covers all costs
0.73
0
1
Institution covers in part
0.148
0
1
Institution does not cover any cost
0.122
0
1
Institution covers offsets
0.640
0
1
Ethical reservations
0.202
0
1
Practical reservations
0.153
0
1
Transport modes (multiple transport modes possible)
Walking, cycling
0.025
0
1
Car
0.074
0
1
Km driven by car
7.3 (60.43)
0
700
Coach
0.07
0
1
Km driven by coach
22.242 (124.973)
0
1300
Train
0.409
0
1
Km driven by train
209.885 (460.402)
0
2600
Flight within the country
0.025
0
1
Flight within Europe
0.587
0
1
Flight from outside Europe
0.07
0
1
Environmental and academic preferences
Participation at EAERE conferences
0.913 (1.723)
0
9
Participation at ESEE conferences
1.492 (1.813)
0
9
Business as usual
0.023
0
1
Green growth
0.355
0
1
Degrowth
0.523
0
1
Satisfaction with offset options
5.044 (1.827)
0
7
Satisfaction with vegetarian options
5.097 (1.84)
0
7
Satisfaction with packaging
4.409 (1.867)
1
7
Satisfaction with recycling options
4.23 (1.91)
1
7
Standard deviations in parentheses.

225
230
230
320
89
242
242
242
242
237
242
240
242
226
242
242
242
242
242
220
220
220
183
155
149
148

Table A.III: Emblematic examples of reservations related to offsets
Reservations
Contrasting behavioral changes necessary to deal with climate change
“Could make people fly more if they think offsetting solves all environmental harm from flying”
“I am not convinced that CO2 offsets actually work but rather think that I am buying a relief for my bad conscience”
“I think it is just a patch, we would need to modify much more our lifestyles/society/culture”
“In the end are an excuse for inaction amongst high emitters who acknowledge the climate change problem
but see themselves as too important to make the necessary and significant adjustments to their own live;
so they "buy indulgences" instead”
“In the long run, a change of habit is necessary for which those offsets might actually become an obstacle”
“Given the urgency of climate issue, CO2 offsets are illusive.
Offsets only work if we’re already at low enough emission levels (i.e. consume and produce within planetary boundaries)”
“To induce moral licensing and to foster poor environmental behaviors with the reason that you “offset it” ”
Pricing the unpriceable
“I don’t believe in putting a price on carbon emissions. I would rather lower my emissions as low as possible”
“[...] Ideologically, I am not in favor of market-based instruments for conservation”
Doubts on the effective realization of carbon offsets
“[...] Once CO2 from fossil sources is released, any way to store it will not be as long-lasting”
“Lack of proof that it is working. Not enough transparency on how this money is invested”
“I’m never quite sure where the money really goes”
“Simply planting trees won’t help, they also need to be cared for”
“Want to make sure that offsets are high quality, solid MRV, gold standard, retirement of EUETS or the likes”
“The effectiveness of these projects in actually decreasing emissions at the source has been questioned by several scholars”
“My skepticism was fully confirmed by the latest Nature article on misuse of JI in Russia/Ukraine.
Similarly, I have experienced firsthand practical problems with forestation problems in the tropics”

Conference
EAERE
EAERE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
EAERE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE

